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Abstract: We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve
heterogeneous consumers with electric vehicles (EVs) under a governments price-discount incentive
scheme that involves a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We show that the subsidy ceiling is
more e¤ective in inuencing the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the manufacturer with a higher
unit production cost. However, the discount rate is more e¤ective for the manufacturer with a lower
unit production cost. Moreover, the expected sales are increasing in the discount rate but may be
decreasing in the subsidy ceiling. Analytic results indicate that an e¤ective incentive scheme should
include both a discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We also derive the necessary condition for the
most e¤ective discount rate and subsidy ceiling that maximize the expected sales of EVs, and obtain
a unique discount rate and subsidy ceiling that most e¤ectively improve the manufacturers incentive
for EV production.
Key words: electric vehicle; supply chain; price discount; incentive scheme.
1 Introduction
The rapid development of the automobile industry in the past ve decades has not only resulted in
signicant convenience to consumers but has also generated an increasingly serious air pollution prob-
lem. The environmental impact has pressured a number of governments to implement price-discount
incentive schemes to promote the electric vehicle (EV). Under such schemes, each EV consumer
can enjoy a price discount calculated as a price discount rate times the retail price charged to the
consumer but limited to a subsidy ceiling. For example, the Spanish government provides a price
discount equal to 25% of the purchase price, with a cap of e6,000, to each consumer who purchases
a new electric car. Similar price-discount schemes have been implemented in other countries, such as
the United Kingdom and Romania. For more details, see online Appendix A.
Motivated by the above practices, we consider a price-discount incentive scheme that includes a
price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We investigate an EV supply chain that involves a manu-
facturer and a retailer under such a scheme. In practice, the retail price of an automobile may di¤er
1The authors wish to thank three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments that helped improve this paper.
2Corresponding author (mmleng@ln.edu.hk; Tel: +852 2616-8104; Fax: +852 2892-2442).
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among consumers because of the fact that the price for each consumer is not set by the retailer but is
determined as a result of the negotiation between the consumer and the retailer. We use cooperative
game theory to compute the negotiated retail price for each consumer and derive the expected sales
function. To our knowledge, no government has implemented a price-discount scheme or a similar
concept for any other market that involves price negotiation between the consumer and retailer. Thus,
the bargaining analysis which is our key modeling approach and its results are only applicable to
the sale of vehicles. We then develop the manufacturers expected prot function and maximize it
to obtain a unique optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer. Using these results, we investigate
the e¤ect of both the price discount rate and subsidy ceiling on the manufacturers optimal wholesale
price, the expected sales, and the manufacturers maximum expected prot.
In this paper, we use the stimulated EV sales to measure the reduction in air pollution, because
of the following fact: Stimulating the EV sales would induce more consumers to use EVs instead of
fuel vehicles. As roughly calculated by Cuenca, Gaines, and Vyas [5] and MacKay [12], the use of
an EV can help reduce carbon emissions by approximately 30 tons compared with the use of a fuel
vehicle. Therefore, stimulating EV sales can be used as a surrogate measure for the reduction in air
pollution. Accordingly, we examine the impact of the incentive scheme on the expected sales of EVs.
Very few EV-related publications exist in the operations management area. Chocteau et al. [4]
developed a cooperative game model to investigate the e¤ect of the collaboration among commercial
eets on the adoption of EVs. Avci et al. [1] examined the adoption and environmental impact of EVs
with battery swapping, and Mak et al. [13] constructed robust optimization models for the planning
of battery swapping infrastructures. Sioshansi [17] investigated the incentives of consumers making
charging decisions with di¤erent electricity tari¤s.
Our paper is closely related to the recent publication by Huang et al. [7] who examined a govern-
ment subsidy scheme for EVs in a duopoly setting in which a fuel automobile supply chain and an
electric-and-fuel automobile supply chain compete for consumers. The incentive scheme in [7] only
includes a xed subsidy, whereas the price-discount scheme in our paper involves the retail price-
dependent subsidy that cannot exceed a ceiling value. Moreover, Huang et al. [7] drew most of their
managerial insights from numerical experiments; in our paper we analytically investigate an EV sup-
ply chain under a price-discount scheme and examine the e¤ectiveness of the scheme in stimulating
EV sales. Since both xed-subsidy and price-discount schemes exist in practice, our paper and Huang
et al. [7] complement each other in terms of research methodologies, contributions to literature, and
ndings for practitioners.
Unlike in [7], we do not consider any fuel vehicle (FV) but only focus on an EV supply chain.
This is reasonable because of the following two facts. First, in the automobile industry, there are a
number of EV supply chains where the electric vehicles mainly include REVAi, Buddy, Citroën C1
evie, Fisker Automotive, Tesla Roadster, Smart ED, Wheego Whip LiFe, and so on. Therefore, the
EV supply chain in our model exists in practice. Second, the sales of all EVs account for only a tiny
share of the current automobile market. For example, in the United States, the share of EV sales
was only 0.53% during the rst six months of 2013 (see hybridcars.com). Thus, any issue in the EV
market is unlikely to signicantly a¤ect the FV market.
Price discount is a commonly-used promotion strategy and has been widely investigated in market-
ing and operations management elds. For publications regarding price-discount schemes applicable
to supply chain members, see Bernstein et al. [3], Klastorin et al. [9], and Wang [18]; for publi-
cations concerning price-discount schemes applicable to end consumers, see Gerstner and Hess [6],
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Huchzermeier et al. [8], Kurata and Liu [10], and Sheu [16]. In the abovementioned publications,
price-discount schemes are implemented by a manufacturer or retailer to increase sales or coordinate
a supply chain. In addition, a few publications (e.g., Jørgensen and Zaccour [15] and Ma et al. [11])
analyzed a governments subsidy. We examine the governments price-discount scheme for EVs that
aims to reduce air pollution. Moreover, we consider the negotiation of retail price for each consumer,
unlike in the abovementioned publications where retail price is determined by the rm.
2 Negotiated Retail Price
Under the governments price-discount incentive scheme, the government provides subsidy to the
consumer who purchases an EV from a retailer. This subsidy is the minimum of the price discount
(the discount rate  times the original retail price charged to the consumer) and subsidy ceiling A. To
simplify our statement, we hereafter denote such a price-discount scheme by (;A). In most practices
in todays automobile market, the retail price for each consumer results from the negotiation between
the consumer and the retailer. Accordingly, we apply the theory of cooperative game to determine
the negotiated retail price for a consumer who is assumed to have valuation (consumption gain)  on
the EV.
A common solution to two-player games in cooperative game theory is Nash bargaining scheme
(Nash [14]). The consumer pays retail price p, enjoys the consumption gain , and obtains the subsidy
amounting to min(p;A) from the government when he or she trades with the retailer. Thus, the
consumers net gain is calculated as uc     p + min(p;A). The retailer orders the EV from
the manufacturer at wholesale price w; thus, the retailers prot resulting from the trade with the
consumer is computed as ur  p w. Noting that neither the consumer nor the retailer will obtain any
gain or prot if they cannot reach an agreement in their transaction, we construct a Nash bargaining
model as follows:
maxp  = [   p+ min(p;A)] (p  w) s.t.    p+ min(p;A)  0 and p  w  0. (1)
Therefore, if the manufacturers wholesale price w is su¢ ciently high such that w  A=, then
p  A= because p  w; thus, min(p;A) = A. This condition means that when w  A=, the
consumer should obtain subsidy ceiling A from the government, and the discount rate  does not take
e¤ect in the incentive scheme. If w < A=, then the consumer obtains either price discount p or
subsidy ceiling A, depending on negotiated retail price p.
Theorem 1 Given the manufacturers wholesale price w, we nd that under the incentive scheme
(;A), the retail price for the consumer with the valuation , resulting from the negotiation between
the consumer and the retailer, can be obtained as follows:
1. When w  A=, the consumer does not buy from the retailer if  <   (1   )w; however, if
  , then the consumer trades with the retailer at negotiated price p as given below.
p =
8><>:
p1  [w + =(1  )]=2, if     ^  2(1  )A=  (1  )w;
p2  A=, if ^    2A= A  w;
p3  ( +A+ w)=2, if   2A= A  w.
(2)
If the consumers valuation  is in the range [; ^], then the amount of the subsidy awarded to
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the consumer is smaller than A; otherwise, if   ^, then the consumer obtains a subsidy in
amount of A.
2. When w  A=, the consumer may or may not buy from the retailer, depending on the con-
sumers valuation . Specically, if  < w   A, then the consumer and the retailer would not
reach an agreement on the retail price; however, if   w A, then the consumer and the retailer
trade at the negotiated price p = p3; the consumer can obtain subsidy A from the government.
Proof. For the proof of this theorem and those for all subsequent theorems, see online Appendix B.
In the above theorem,  denotes the after-discount payment made by consumers who buy from
the retailer at wholesale price w. Since the wholesale price is the lowest retail price,  can be viewed
as the smallest purchase cost for consumers. That is, if the discount for any purchase at the wholesale
price does not exceed the subsidy ceiling, then a consumers buying decision depends on whether
his or her valuation is greater than the smallest purchase cost. If the consumers valuation is less
than the smallest purchase cost, then he or she cannot enjoy any positive net gain from buying an
EV. Otherwise, the consumer should be willing to make a purchase. In Theorem 1, the threshold
^ represents the minimum valuation of consumers who obtain the maximum subsidy A. When a
consumers valuation is less than the minimum value, the consumer will receive subsidy p, which is
lower than subsidy ceiling A; otherwise, the consumer will receive the maximum subsidy.
We reasonably assume that  is a random variable with p.d.f. f() and c.d.f. F () given that
consumersvaluations di¤er in practice. Using Theorem 1, we nd that the probability for a successful
transaction can be calculated as 1 F (w min(w;A)). Assuming that B potential consumers exist
in the market, we can express the expected sales as
D(w) = B[1  F (w  min(w;A))] =
(
D1(w)  B[1  F ((1  )w)], if w  A=,
D2(w)  B[1  F (w  A)], if w  A=.
(3)
3 Optimal Wholesale Price and Scheme E¤ectiveness
3.1 Optimal Wholesale Price
The manufacturer incurs production cost c and obtains sales revenue w from the retailer for each EV
unit. Therefore, the manufacturers expected prot can be constructed as
M (w) =
(
M1(w)  B(w   c)[1  F ((1  )w)], if w  A=,
M2(w)  B(w   c)[1  F (w  A)], if w  A=.
(4)
The manufacturer maximizes its prot M (w) in (4) to determine the optimal wholesale price w. To
solve the maximization problem, we need to (i) solve the maximization problems maxwA= M1(w)
and maxwA= M2(w) to obtain the corresponding optimal wholesale prices w1 and w2, respectively,
and (ii) compare M1(w1) and M2(w2) to attain the global optimal solution w.
Lemma 1 If p.d.f. f() is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave, then when we maximize
M1(w) in (4) subject to w  A= and when we maximize M2(w) in (4) subject to w  A=,
the corresponding optimal wholesale prices can be determined as w1 = min(w^1(); A=) and w2 =
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max(w^2(A); A=), respectively, where w^1() and w^2(A) can be uniquely obtained by solving
w^1() = c+
1  F ((1  )w^1())
(1  ) f((1  )w^1()) and w^2(A) = c+
1  F (w^2(A) A)
f(w^2(A) A) , (5)
respectively. Both w^1() and w^2(A) are increasing in c. Moreover, if w^2(A)  A=, then w^1() 
w^2(A). That is, if w2 = w^2(A), then w1 = A=; otherwise, if w2 = A=, then w1 may be equal to
w^1() or A=.
Proof. For the proof of this lemma and those for all subsequent lemmas, see online Appendix C.
The above lemma indicates that the uniqueness of solutions w^1() and w^2(A) requires the con-
tinuous di¤erentiability and log-concavity of p.d.f. f(). Bagnoli and Bergstrom [2] noted that a
probability density function is log-concave if its logarithm is concave. The log-concavity possesses an
important property: a log-concave p.d.f. can result in the quasi-concavity of objective functions in the
operations management area. In this paper, the log-concavity of p.d.f. f() implies that consumers
do not have multiple separate most-likely valuations on the EV and that very few consumers have
extremely low or high valuations. Many commonly-used probability distributions such as uniform,
normal, exponential, logistic, Laplace, Weibull, and Gamma are continuously di¤erentiable and log-
concave. Thus, we reasonably assume that f() is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave.
Lemma 1 indicates that w^1() is only dependent on the price discount rate whereas w^2(A) is
only dependent on the subsidy ceiling. We investigate the e¤ects of  and A on w^1() and w^2(A),
respectively, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 We nd that 0 < @w^1()=@ < w^1()=(1   ) that is, w^1() is increasing in the price
discount rate  and that both D1(w^1()) and M1(w^1()) are increasing in . In addition, 0 <
@w^2(A)=@A < 1, that is, w^2(A) is increasing in subsidy ceiling A; D2(w^2(A)) and M2(w^2(A)) are
both increasing in A. 
The above lemma indicates that w^1() is increasing in . When the value of A is xed, A=
is decreasing in . Hence, a unique value 0 exists such that w^1(0) = A=0. We then nd that
w^1() > A= if  > 0 and w^1() < A= if  < 0. Given that w^1() uniquely satises an equation
in (5), we replace w^1(0) with A=0 and nd that 0 can be uniquely obtained by solving the equation
below.
1  F ((1  0)A=0)  (A=0   c)(1  0)f((1  0)A=0) = 0, (6)
which implies that 0 is a function of A. Therefore, given subsidy ceiling A, the optimal wholesale
price for the maximization problem maxwA= M1(w) is A=0 if the price discount rate is 0.
Given a value of , as A increases, w^2(A) also increases at slope @w^2(A)=@A, which is smaller than
one, and A= increases at slope 1=, which is greater than one. Since w^2(A) > 0 and A= = 0 when
A = 0, a unique subsidy ceiling A0 exists such that w^2(A0) = A0=. If A < A0, then w^2(A) > A=;
if A > A0, then w^2(A) < A=. Similar to our above discussion on 0, we nd that A0 is a function
of  and uniquely satises the following equation:
1  F (A0= A0)  (A0=  c)f(A0= A0) = 0. (7)
Hence, given price discount rate , the optimal wholesale price for the maximization problemmaxwA= M2(w)
is A0= if the subsidy ceiling is A0.
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Lemma 3 We nd that for a given subsidy ceilingA, A=0  w^2(A) andM1(w^1(0)) < M2(w^2(A));
for a given discount rate , A0=  w^1() and M1(w^1()) > M2(w^2(A0)). 
Using the above lemma, we can determine the manufacturers globally-optimal wholesale price w
that maximizes M (w) in (4), as provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Given the price-discount incentive scheme (;A), we nd that the manufacturers opti-
mal wholesale price w can be uniquely determined as,
w =
8><>:
w^1(), if 0 <   0, or, A  A1  w^1();
A=, if 0    1  A=w^2(A), or, A0  A  A1;
w^2(A), if 1   < 1, or, 0 < A  A0. 
(8)
Two alternative inequalities exist for each condition (stated after if) in the theorem above. As
indicated by Theorem 2, if the government adopts a discount rate  that is smaller than 0, then
subsidy ceiling A will not a¤ect the manufacturers optimal wholesale pricing decision, expected sales
D1(w^1()), and the manufacturers expected prot M1(w^1()). The value 0 can thus be explained
as the minimum price discount rate for the e¤ectiveness of a given subsidy ceiling. Theorem 2 also
indicates that if the discount rate  is greater than 1 (i.e.,  > 1) or, subsidy ceiling A is less
than A0 (i.e., A < A0), then the manufacturers optimal wholesale price will be dependent on A but
independent of . Therefore, A0 is the minimum subsidy ceiling for the e¤ectiveness of a given price
discount rate. Similar to our discussion for the case where  < 0, we nd that when  > 1, only the
subsidy ceiling in the governments incentive scheme a¤ects the expected sales and the manufacturers
expected prot.
Remark 1 In (8), 1 and A1 represent the maximum e¤ective price-discount rate and subsidy ceiling,
respectively. That is, the e¤ective price discount rate  should be smaller than or equal to 1.
A discount rate  larger than 1 cannot inuence EV sales, and should not be involved into the
government incentive scheme, which should only include a subsidy ceiling. Similarly, the e¤ectiveness
of subsidy ceiling A requires that A be smaller than or equal to A1. 
Moreover, if the manufacturer incurs a high unit production cost c, then the values of 0 and 1
will be reduced, because of the following: 0 is a unique value that satises w^1(0) = A=0. As the
value of c increases, w^1(0) > A=0 because wholesale price w^1() is increasing in c, as indicated by
Lemma 1; there must exist a unique value 00 such that 00 < 0 and w^1(00) = A=00. Similarly, we
can show that if the value of c increases, then 1 will decrease. We then nd from (8) that because
the value of c is high, the range (0; 0) in which only discount rate  takes e¤ect is small; however,
the range (1; 1) in which only subsidy ceiling A takes e¤ect is large.
Remark 2 The result above implies that if the manufacturer incurs a higher unit production cost,
then subsidy ceiling A is more e¤ective in inuencing the optimal wholesale pricing decision and the
expected sales. In todays automobile market, the production cost for EVs is high, mainly because
the EV battery is costly. Similarly, we conclude that a lower unit production cost will result in a
higher e¤ectiveness of discount rate  in the wholesale pricing decision and the expected sales. 
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3.2 E¤ectiveness of the Incentive Scheme
We investigate the e¤ect of price discount rate  and subsidy ceiling A on expected sales D(w) and
the manufacturers expected prot M (w).
3.2.1 E¤ect of the Incentive Scheme on Expected Sales
The analysis of expected sales is very important in our paper. Using Theorem 2 and Lemma 2, we
obtain the following results.
1. If discount rate  is in the range (0; 0) or equivalently, subsidy ceiling A is greater than A1, then
both the optimal wholesale price w = w^1() and resulting expected sales D(w) are increasing
in  but are independent of A.
2. If  2 [0; 1] or A 2 [A0; A1], then w = A=, which is decreasing in  but is increasing in A.
As a result, expected sales D(A=) are increasing in  but are decreasing in A.
3. If  2 (1; 1) or A 2 (0; A0), then wholesale price w = w^2(A) is independent of  and thus,
expected sales D(w^2(A)) do not depend on . However, the wholesale price and expected sales
are both increasing in A.
Remark 3 Following the discussion above, we nd that expected sales D(w) reaches its maximum
value when   1 = A=w^2(A). Noting that the incentive scheme mainly aims to stimulate EV sales
for the reduction of air pollution, we nd that the price discount rate should be set to   1 to
e¤ectively increase the expected sales of the EV. However, as indicated in Remark 1, the e¤ectiveness
of the price discount rate  requires that   1. Therefore, to maximize the EV sales, the government
should set the discount rate to  = 1. Similarly, to maximize D(w), the government should set the
subsidy ceiling to A = A0. 
The above remark indicates that for a given subsidy ceiling A, the most e¤ective price discount
rate should be  = 1 = A=w^2(A); for a given discount rate , the most e¤ective subsidy ceiling
should be A = A0. The most e¤ective price discount rate and subsidy ceiling (denoted by  and A,
respectively) should satisfy the conditions  = A=w^2(A) and A = A0(), which can be obtained
by solving (7) where  is replaced with . According to (5) and (7), we nd that the condition
 = A=w^2(A) is equivalent to the condition A = A0(). Thus, the most e¤ective incentive
scheme (; A) that maximizes the expected EV sales should satisfy the condition 1 F (A= 
A)   (A=   c)f(A=   A) = 0, which is a necessary condition for the most e¤ective scheme.
Therefore, the government may need to include both a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling in its
incentive scheme to e¤ectively stimulate EV sales.
3.2.2 Impact of the Incentive Scheme on the Manufacturers Expected Prot
The incentive scheme should entice the manufacturer to invest in EV production. The high purchasing
price of EVs, which is the main factor that discourages consumers from purchasing EVs, is partly
ascribed to manufacturersvery low production volumes. Thus, we should also investigate whether
the manufacturer can benet from the incentive scheme by achieving a high expected prot and will
thus have a motivation to promote EV sales for the reduction of air pollution.
Similar to our discussion on the impact of the incentive scheme on sales, we use Theorem 2
and Lemma 2 and nd that (i) if  2 (0; 0) or A > A1, then the manufacturers expected prot
M (w
) = M (w^1()) is increasing in the discount rate  but is independent of subsidy ceiling A;
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and (ii) if  2 (1; 1) or A 2 (0; A0), then the manufacturers expected prot M (w) = M (w^2(A))
is independent of  but is increasing in A. However, we cannot immediately determine the e¤ect of
 2 [0; 1] and A 2 [A0; A1] on the manufacturers expected prot. Theorem 2 indicates that, if
 2 [0; 1] or A 2 [A0; A1], then the manufacturers expected prot is M (w) = M (A=).
Theorem 3 If  2 [0; 1] or A 2 [A0; A1], then the manufacturers expected prot M (A=) is
increasing in both discount rate  and subsidy ceiling A. 
According to the discussion above, we can draw managerial insights as indicated in the following
remark.
Remark 4 The government should select a price discount rate  that is not smaller than 1 to
maximize the manufacturers expected prot M (w) and e¤ectively improve the manufacturers
incentive for EV production. Remark 1 also indicates that  should not be larger than 1, as a result
of assuring the e¤ectiveness of the discount rate. Therefore, the government should set its discount
rate to  = 1 = A=w^2(A) to maximize M (w) for the improvement of the EV manufacturers
production incentive. Similarly, to maximize M (w), the government should set its subsidy ceiling
to A = A1 = w^1(). 
The above remark reveals that the most e¤ective price discount rate and subsidy ceiling for the
improvement of the EV manufacturers production incentive (denoted by ~ and ~A, respectively)
should satisfy the following conditions:
~ = ~A=w^2( ~A) and ~A = ~w^1(~). (9)
Hence, the most e¤ective incentive scheme (~; ~A) that maximizes the manufacturers expected
prot M (w) can be uniquely obtained by solving the two equations in (9).
If the government adopts the unique most e¤ective scheme (~; ~A) for improving the EV man-
ufacturers production incentive, then 0 = 1 = ~ and A0 = A1 = ~A, where 0 and A0 uniquely
satisfy (6) and (7), respectively. Therefore, we conclude that, to most e¤ectively improve the incentive
of the EV manufacturer, the government may need to include both a price discount rate and a subsidy
ceiling in its incentive scheme.
4 Conclusions
We investigated an automobile supply chain under the governments price-discount scheme that is
implemented to stimulate the sales of electric vehicles. A number of analytic managerial insights were
drawn. We showed that the negotiated retail price for each consumer is increasing in the wholesale
price and the consumers valuation. The retail price for the consumer with a low valuation is mainly
dependent on the price discount rate, whereas the retail price for the consumer with a high valuation is
mainly dependent on the subsidy ceiling. Moreover, the subsidy ceiling is more e¤ective in inuencing
the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the manufacturer with a higher unit production cost, whereas
the discount rate is more e¤ective for the manufacturer with a lower unit production cost.
We also showed that for a given subsidy ceiling, only a discount rate that is smaller than the
maximum e¤ective price-discount rate can a¤ect the EV sales; for a given discount rate, only a
subsidy ceiling that is smaller than the maximum e¤ective subsidy ceiling can a¤ect sales. The
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incentive scheme may need to include both a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling to e¤ectively
increase EV sales. Moreover, we derived a necessary condition for the most e¤ective discount rate
and subsidy ceiling that maximize the expected EV sales. We also obtained a unique discount rate
and subsidy ceiling that maximize the manufacturers expected prot and most e¤ectively improve
the manufacturers incentive for EV production.
We investigated an EV supply chain in which only EV is produced and sold. This may not be
consistent with most scenarios in the automobile industry. As Huang et al. [7] mentioned, an analysis
for a supply chain that involves EVs and fuel vehicles should be more realistic. In the future, we
plan to analyze the e¤ect of price-discount schemes on a supply chain that produces both automobile
types.
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Appendix A Price-Discount Incentive Schemes for Electric Vehicles
The rapid development of the automobile industry in the past ve decades has not only resulted
in signicant convenience to consumers but has also generated an increasingly serious air pollution
problem. The environmental impact has pressured a number of governments to promote the electric
vehicle (EV), which has not yet dominated the automobile market mainly because the lack of electric
charging stations and high purchase price discourage most consumers from purchasing such vehicles.
As a response to the high price of electric vehicles which is partly attributed to very low pro-
duction volume, some governments have implemented incentive schemes to provide each consumer a
price discount and thus improve EV sales. In Romania, the government provides subsidy amounting
to 25% of the retail price, capped at e5,000, to each consumer who purchases a new electric car.
Since January 2011, the British government has implemented a price discount scheme similar to that
of the Romanian government. In Spains incentive scheme, each consumer who buys a new electric
car can enjoy a price discount equal to 25% of the purchase price (before tax), with a cap of e6,000;
each consumer who purchases an electric bus or van can obtain a price discount in amount of 25%
of the purchase price (up to e15,000 and e30,000 for the bus and the van, respectively). For more
information on price-discount incentive schemes for EVs, see Wikipedia.org [19].
The situations above indicate that price-discount incentive schemes (e.g., in Romania, Spain, and
the United Kingdom) consist of a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling, which is the maximum
subsidy for each EV consumer.
Appendix B Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. When w  A=, we consider these two cases: p  A, and p  A. We
begin by analyzing the case wherein p  A.
1. When p  A, we temporarily ignore the constraints, write the Nash bargaining model as
 = (   p + p)(p   w), and maximize it to obtain the corresponding optimal retail price as
p1 = [w+ =(1 )]=2. From (1), we nd that, to satisfy the constraints, retail price p must be
determined such that w  p  =(1   ), which is satised if    = (1   )w. Otherwise, if
 < , then the constraints in (1) cannot be satised and the consumer does not buy from the
retailer.
Assuming that   , we nd that if   ^ where ^ is dened as in (2), then p1 must be smaller
than or equal to A=; thus, p = p1. If   ^, then p = p2 = A=. Summarizing the above, we
obtain
p =
(
p1, if     ^,
p2, if   ^.
2. When p  A, temporarily ignoring the constraints, we nd that the Nash bargaining model in
(1) can be re-written as  = ( p+A)(p w), which is maximized at point p3 = (+A+w)=2.
To satisfy the constraints, we require that retail price p be determined such that w  p  +A,
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which is assured when   w   A. If  < w   A, then the consumer and the retailer cannot
reach an agreement on their transaction.
Under the condition that   w   A, we nd that, if   2A=   A   w, then p = p3; if
  2A= A  w, then p = p2 = A=. In summary, we obtain
p =
(
p2, if   2A= A  w,
p3, if   2A= A  w.
In order to nd the optimal retail price p for the constrained maximization problem in (1), we
need to compare the case wherein p  A and the case wherein p  A. Because w  A=,
^   (2A= A  w) = (w  A=)  0. The following ve possibilities must be considered.
1. If  < , then the consumer and retailer cannot reach an agreement over the retail price.
2. If     A=   A, then the consumer and retailer will complete their transaction at retail
price as p1 for the case where p  A; however, the two players cannot reach an agreement on
the retail price for the case where p > A. Thus, when     A=   A, the consumer will
buy an EV from the retailer at price p = p1.
3. If A= A    ^, then p1  A. According to the analysis above, the consumer and retailer
will set the retail price as p1 for the case where p  A; however, the two players should choose
retail price p2 = A= for the case where p  A. Hence, the consumer will buy an EV from the
retailer at price p = p1.
4. If ^    2A=   A   w, then the consumer and retailer will set the retail price as p2 = A=
for both the case where p  A and the case where p  A. Therefore, the consumer and the
retailer will reach an agreement on price p = p2.
5. If   2A=  A  w, then p3  A. The consumer and retailer will determine the retail price
as p2 for the case where p  A. However, the two players should decide to complete their
transaction at retail price p3 for the case where p  A. Hence, the consumer will buy an EV
at price p = p3.
Similarly, when w  A=, we can determine the negotiated retail price as given in this theorem.
We thus complete our proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. When 0 <   0, w^1()  A=, which can be alternatively written as
A  A1 = w^1(). Thus, the optimal wholesale price for the problem maxwA= M1(w) is w1 =
min(w^1(); A=) = w^1(). As Lemma 3 indicates that for a given subsidy ceiling A, A=0  w^2(A),
we nd that A=  w^2(A); thus, the optimal wholesale price for the problem maxwA= M2(w)
is w2 = max(w^2(A); A=) = A=. M1(w^1())  M1(A=) = M2(A=), which means that if
0 <   0 or, A  A1  w^1(), then the optimal wholesale price is w = w^1().
When 0    1 = A=w^2(A), we nd that A  A0 and w^2(A)  A=; and w^1()  A=, or
alternatively, A  A1. Thus, the optimal wholesale prices for the problems maxwA= M1(w) and
maxwA= M2(w) are obtained as w1 = min(w^1(); A=) = A= and w2 = max(w^2(A); A=) = A=,
respectively; the optimal wholesale price is w = A=.
When 1   < 1, we nd that w^2(A)  A= or A  A0. Thus, the optimal wholesale prices
for the problems maxwA= M1(w) and maxwA= M2(w) are obtained as w1 = min(w^1(); A=) =
A= and w2 = max(w^2(A); A=) = w^2(A), respectively. SinceM1(A=) = M2(A=)  M2(w^2(A)),
the optimal wholesale price is w = w^2(A).
We thus prove this theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 3. We begin by investigating the e¤ect of subsidy ceiling A on M (A=).
We learn from the proof of Lemma 1 that both M1(w) and M2(w) are log-concave functions with
maximum points at w^1() and w^2(A), respectively. It also follows from the comparison between
M1(w) and M2(w) in (4) that M1(w) < M2(w) when w < A=; M1(w) = M2(w) when
w = A=; and M1(w) > M2(w) when w > A=. This means that M1(w) and M2(w) intersect
at point w = A=.
Lemma 3 indicates that for a given value of discount rate , A0=  w^1() and M1(w^1()) >
M2(w^2(A0)). When A = A0, the optimal value w^2(A0) that maximizes M2(w) is equal to A0=,
and M1(w) and M2(w) intersect at point w = w^2(A0), which corresponds to Case (1) in Figure 1(a).
In this gure, the solid and dotted lines represent M1(w) and M2(w), respectively. In addition,
when A = A1 = w^1(), M1(w) and M2(w) intersect at point w = w^1(), where M1(w) reaches
its maximum value. This corresponds to Case (3) in Figure 1(a).
Figure 1: The e¤ects of A and  on the manufacturers maximum expected prot. The solid and
dotted lines represent M1(w) and M2(w), respectively.
When A 2 [A0; A1], M1(w) and M2(w) intersect at point w = A=; see the corresponding Case
(2) in Figure 1(a). M1(w) is independent of A; however, both w^2(A) and M2(w^2(A)) are increasing
in A, as shown in Lemma 2. In Figure 1(a), increasing the value of A in the range [A0; A1] will not
alter curve M1(w) but will increase the values of w^2(A) and M2(w^2(A)). Therefore, point w = A=
at which M1(w) and M2(w) intersect will also increase when the value of A increases. Noting from
Theorem 2 that w = A= if A 2 [A0; A1], we nd that the manufacturers maximum expected prot
M (w
) is increasing in A.
Similarly, we can plot Figure 1(b) to show that as price discount rate  increases in the range
[0; 1], the value of A= at which M1(w) and M2(w) intersect decreases and the manufacturers
maximum expected prot M (w) = M (A=) increases. This theorem is thus proven.
Appendix C Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1. We consider the maximization problem maxwA= M1(w). Temporarily
ignoring the constraint that w  A=, we take the rst- and second-order derivatives of M1(w) with
respect to w and obtain
@M1(w)=@w = B[1  F ((1  )w)] B(w   c)(1  )f((1  )w), (10)
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and
@2M1(w)=@w
2 =  2B(1  )f((1  )w) B(w   c)(1  )2f 0((1  )w).
Solving the rst-order condition that @M1(w)=@w = 0 yields w^1() as in (5). Substituting the above
solution into the second-order derivative, we obtain
@2M1(w)
@w2

w=w^1()
=  B(1  )2[f((1  )w^1())]
2 + f 0((1  )w^1())[1  F ((1  )w^1())]
f((1  )w^1()) ,
which is negative if p.d.f. f() is di¤erentiable and log-concave. That is, assuming the di¤erentiability
and log-concavity of f(), we nd that at the value of w that satises @M1(w)=@w = 0, the second-
order derivative of M1(w) is negative, namely, @2M1(w)=@w2j@M1(w)=@w=0 < 0. Thus, M1(w) is
a quasi-concave (unimodal) function of w, and the optimal price w1 that maximizes M1(w) subject
to w  A= can be uniquely obtained as w1 = min(w^1(); A=).
We then solve the maximization problem maxwA= M2(w). Similarly, we calculate the rst- and
second-order derivatives of M2(w) w.r.t. w, and nd that
@M2(w)=@w = B[1  F (w  A)  (w   c)f(w  A)],
@2M2(w)=@w
2 =  B[2f(w  A) + (w   c)f 0(w  A)].
Equating @M2(w)=@w to zero and solving it for w, we obtain w^2(A) as in (5). Substituting w^2(A)
into the second-order derivative yields
@2M2(w)
@w2

w=w^2(A)
=  B 2 [f(w^2(A) A)]
2 + [1  F (w^2(A) A)]f 0(w^2(A) A)
f(w^2(A) A) ,
which is negative if p.d.f. f() is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave. That is, M2(w) is a
quasi-concave (unimodal) function with a unique optimal wholesale price that maximizes M2(w).
The optimal solution for the constrained problem maxwA= M2(w) can then be obtained as w2 =
max(w^2(A); A=).
Next, we investigate the e¤ect of the manufacturers unit production cost c on w^1() and w^2(A).
We di¤erentiate @M1(w)=@w in (10) once w.r.t. c, and obtain
@2M1(w)
@w@c
= B(1  )f((1  )w) > 0,
which means that M1(w) is a supermodular function of w and c. It thus follows that w^1() is
increasing in c. Similarly, we can show the supermodularity property of the function M2(w), which
implies that w^2(A) is increasing in c.
We subsequently discuss w1 = min(w^1(); A=) and w2 = max(w^2(A); A=). We consider the
following four cases:
1. If w^1()  A= and w^2(A)  A=, then w1 = w^1()  w2 = A=.
2. If w^1()  A= and w^2(A)  A=, then w1 = A= = w2 = A=.
3. If w^1()  A= and w^2(A)  A=, then w1 = w^1()  A=  w^2(A) = w2, which is actually
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contrary to the following fact: We re-write w^2(A) in (5) as,
w^2(A) = c+
1  F (w^2(A) A)
f(w^2(A) A) = c+
1  F

1  A
w^2(A)

w^2(A)

f

1  A
w^2(A)

w^2(A)
 .
If w^2(A)  A=, then 1 A=w^2(A)  1   and
1  F (w^2(A) A)
f(w^2(A) A) 
1  F ((1  )w^2(A))
f((1  )w^2(A)) 
1  F ((1  )w^2(A))
(1  ) f((1  )w^2(A)) ,
where the rst inequality results from the continuous di¤erentiability and log-concavity of p.d.f.
f(). Therefore, we obtain
w^2(A)  c+ 1  F ((1  )w^2(A))
(1  ) f((1  )w^2(A)) ;
as a result,
@M1(w)
@w

w=w^2(A)
= B[1  F ((1  )w^2(A))] B(w^2(A)  c)(1  )f((1  )w^2(A))  0,
Noting that w^1() can be uniquely obtained by solving the rst-order condition @M1(w)=@w =
0, namely, @M1(w)=@wjw=w^1() = 0, we nd that when w^2(A)  A=, w^2(A)  w^1() be-
cause M1(w) is a quasi-concave function with a unique optimal solution w^1() that maximizes
M1(w). However, such a result contradicts the case where w^1()  A=  w^2(A), which
means that this case does not occur.
4. If w^1()  A= and w^2(A)  A=, then w1 = A=  w2 = w^2(A).
We thus prove this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. We begin by proving the e¤ect of  on w^1(), D1(w^1()), and M1(w^1()).
Di¤erentiating w^1() in (5) once with respect to , we obtain
@w^1()
@
=
(2w^1()  c)f((1  )w^1()) + (1  )f[w^1()]2   w^1()cgf 0((1  )w^1())
2(1  )f((1  )w^1()) + (1  )2(w^1()  c)f 0((1  )w^1()) . (11)
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the denominator of the fraction above is positive. Noting the rst-
order condition that (1   )(w^1()   c) = [1   F ((1   )w^1())]=f((1   )w^1()), we re-write the
numerator of the fraction in (11) as
(2w^1()  c)f((1  )w^1()) + (1  )f[w^1()]2   w^1()cgf 0((1  )w^1())
= (w^1()  c)f((1  )w^1()) + w^1()[f((1  )w^1()) + (1  )(w^1()  c)
f 0((1  )w^1())]
= (w^1()  c)f((1  )w^1()) + w^1()


[f((1  )w^1())]2 + [1  F ((1  )w^1())]f 0((1  )w^1())
f [(1  )w^1()]

,
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which is positive because of the di¤erentiability and log-concavity of p.d.f. f(). In addition,
@w^1()
@
<
2w^1()f((1  )w^1()) + (1  )f[w^1()]2   w^1()cgf 0((1  )w^1())
2(1  )f((1  )w^1()) + (1  )2[w^1()  c]f 0((1  )w^1()) =
w^1()
1   .
Then, di¤erentiating D1(w^1()) once w.r.t. , we obtain
@D1(w^1())
@
=  Bf((1  )w^1())

 w^1() + (1  )@w^1()
@

> 0,
because @w^1()=@ < w^1()=(1   ). Thus, D1(w^1()) is increasing in , and M1(w^1()) =
(w^1()  c)D1(w^1()) is also increasing in .
Next, we investigate the e¤ect of A on w^2(A), D2(w^2(A)), and M2(w^2(A)). We calculate the
rst-order derivative of w^2(A) in (5) with respect to A and use the rst-order condition. We then
obtain
@w^2(A)
@A
=   [f(w^2(A) A)]
2 + [1  F (w^2(A) A)]f 0(w^2(A) A)
[f(w^2(A) A)]2

@w^2(A)
@A
  1

.
The log-concavity of p.d.f. f() implies that [f(w^2(A) A)]2 + [1 F (w^2(A) A)]f 0(w^2(A) A) > 0.
Hence, @w^2(A)=@A and (@w^2(A)=@A  1) must have di¤erent signs; thus, 0 < @w^2(A)=@A < 1.
We then di¤erentiate D2(w^2(A)) once w.r.t. A, and nd that
@[D2(w^2(A))]=@A = Bf(w^2(A) A)(1  @w^2(A)=@A) > 0,
which means that D2(w^2(A)) is increasing in A. Thus, M2(w^2(A)) = [w^2(A)   c]D2(w^2(A)) is also
increasing in A. The lemma is thus proven.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that A=0 < w^2(A) for a given subsidy ceiling A. Given that w^2(A)
is independent of , 1 must exist such that 1 < 0 and A=1 = w^2(A), which implies that
M1(w^1(1)) = B(w^1(1)  c)[1  F ((1  )w^1(1))],
M2(w^2(A)) = B(w^2(A)  c)[1  F ((1  )w^2(A))].
Since w^1(1) is the optimal solution that maximizesB(w c)[1 F ((1 )w)], we obtainM1(w^1(1)) >
M2(w^2(A)). Similarly, M1(w^1(0)) < M2(w^2(A)) because A=0 = w1(0). It thus follows that
M1(w^1(1)) > M1(w^1(0)). However, because 0 > 1, M1(w^1(0)) > M1(w^1(1)), since
M1(w^1()) is increasing in , as shown in Lemma 2. This result is contrary to the above. Therefore,
A=0  w^2(A) and M1(w^1(0)) < M2(w^2(A)).
Using a similar argument, we nd that A0=  w^1() and M1(w^1()) > M2(w^2(A0)) for a
given value of . The lemma is thus proven.
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